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Understanding and explaining the mechanisms, cognitive processes, and self-regulatory
strategies that enable the acquisition and proficient execution of motor skills pose
significant challenges for the evidence-based practitioner. In this article, we critically
consider contemporary theoretical and research findings focused on the scientific study
of mental processes in elite performers, specifically in relation to the preparation,
practice, and execution of self-paced skills. On examination of some of the current
issues in this ongoing debate, we seek clarity as to best practice, and present evidence
as to why holistic temporally accurate movement cues hold significant advantages for
elite performers.
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Within the realm of performance sport, ap-
propriate self-directed thought processes before
and during task execution have been shown to
make a significant difference to the level of
performance attained (Abernethy, Maxwell,
Jackson, & Masters, 2007; Singer, Lidor, &
Cauraugh, 1993). Researchers currently de-
scribe differing approaches to the attentional
processes underpinning skilled performance.
These range from developing conscious
thoughts related to performance (e.g., self-talk),
to negating the interference certain mal-
cognitions can have on skilled performance
(Moran, 2009).
The bearing that cognitions and mental strat-
egies have on performance, as well as the ability
of the protagonists to suppress conscious activ-
ity as they seek to prepare for and then execute
movements, constitutes a remarkably worth-
while area to consider (Singer, 2000). Further-
more, as evidence-based practitioners seek to
understand the most effective allocation of
thought processes for the sport performers they
are working with, specific empirical literature is
required to guide and inform professional prac-
tice. Therefore, it is in the professional interests
of applied sport psychologists that this debate is
resolved. Reflecting these stances, the purpose
of this article is twofold: to critically consider
the current literature on cognitions and atten-
tional foci pertaining to the execution, practice,
and preparation for elite performance, and sec-
ond, to examine some of the current issues in
this ongoing debate, seeking clarity to deter-
mine guidelines for best practice.
The Role of Automaticity in
Performance Execution
Automaticity is associated with the execution
of skilled movement. From a performer’s per-
spective, it is considered to be fast, effortless
and requires little, or no technical attention on
their part (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Auto-
matic mental processes free one’s limited con-
scious attentional capacity (Kahneman, 1973) to
allow rapid processing, and results in physical
actions that appear to require little or no thought
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(Singer et al., 1993). This is opposed to the
defining features of conscious processing,
which are mental acts that individuals are aware
of, that are intentioned, require effort, and are
also controllable (Logan & Cowan, 1984). Per-
formance impairment experienced by highly
skilled, but anxious, athletes is often owing to
the disruption of automatic task control pro-
cesses (Collins, Jones, Fairweather, Doolan, &
Priestley, 2001; Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996;
Maxwell, Masters, & Eves, 2000). In this re-
gard, two types of thought processes are identified
in the literature as “consciously” interfering with
automated movements: performers exerting con-
scious control over, or monitoring their execution
of movements.
Although there are a number of similarities
between these theoretical positions, there are
important conceptual distinctions related to the
specific mechanisms. Beilock and Carr’s (2001)
explicit monitoring hypothesis predicts that at-
tention paid to explicit step-by-step processes
disrupts the execution of proceduralized motor
skill that normally run outside of conscious
awareness. In contrast, Masters’ (1992) theory
of reinvestment suggests that it is the controlled
processing of motor skill execution that disrupts
autonomous performance. Jackson, Ashford,
and Norsworthy (2006) have suggested that ex-
plicit monitoring may have a general disruptive
effect on motor control and that additional dis-
ruption might occur when performers attempt to
consciously control, as well as monitor, their
movements. The process of conscious control
uses the resources of working memory (Badde-
ley, 2001) because it requires that task-relevant
declarative knowledge be recalled from storage
in memory and manipulated consciously to
control the movements of the task. The pro-
posed mechanism of disruption is therefore the
effortful allocation of attention to previously
automated processes (Lewis & Linder, 1997).
However, the comparative effects of these two
types of conscious thought processing
on skilled performance have yet to be investi-
gated empirically.
In an attempt to address this unresolved issue,
Toner and Moran (2011) designed an experi-
ment using a more ecologically valid task than
those used previously. Specifically, expert golf-
ers either attended to or adjusted certain aspects
of their technique while kinematic aspects of
their performance were measured. The authors
used a “think-aloud” protocol in an attempt to
identify precisely what features of putting per-
formance expert golfers attend to, when asked
to adopt their normal focus. From the analysis
of the statements, themes emerged relating to
skill-internal (get my weight right on my feet),
skill-external (aim the blade square at the hole),
and rhythm/timing rules (smooth back). Specif-
ically, the “think-aloud” protocol demonstrated
that four participants reported one task-related
thought, while the other 14 participants reported
between two and four task-related thoughts of
which they were consciously aware while they
were addressing the ball and once the putt had
been executed. This finding is interesting, par-
ticularly when noting Beilock and Carr’s (2001)
claims that consciously attending to step-by-
step skilled behavior disrupts the execution of
proceduralized motor skill that normally run
outside of conscious awareness. Another inter-
esting comparison can be made with Masters’
(1992) assertion that manipulating conscious
rule-based knowledge in an effort to control
movements disrupts the procedural nature of
expert performance. Conversely, Ericsson and
colleagues (Ericsson, 2002; Ericsson, Krampe,
& Tesch-Römer, 1993; Williams & Ericsson,
2005) have argued that a defining characteristic
of such performance is the fact that experts
appear to be able to monitor and control their
“real-time” performance.
Offering a potential clarification, Toner and
Moran (2011) found that conscious monitor-
ing (paying attention to a specific aspect of
one’s skill) had a more disruptive influence
on putting proficiency than conscious control
(technically adjusting golfers’ putting
strokes), indicating that expert golfers’ put-
ting was most proficient when they focused
externally, or on rhythmical properties of
their movements (MacPherson, Collins, &
Morriss, 2008). Moreover, Toner and Moran
(2011) found that conscious control disrupted
the overall consistency of the movement. Spe-
cifically, motion analysis technology indi-
cated that technical adjustments did slow
down and disrupt a number of important ki-
nematic features (namely, back-swing times,
forward-swing times, impact timing, and
stroke consistency) of golfers’ putting
strokes. Notably, however, the disruption to
the timing and consistency of the putting
stroke had no significant influence on expert
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golfers’ putting proficiency, the outcome
which, in sporting terms, is the most impor-
tant variable here.
These findings suggest that different forms
of conscious thought processing (i.e., moni-
toring and control) have differential influ-
ences on the execution of expert performance.
Clearly, therefore, further research to validate
the comparative effects of explicit monitoring
and conscious control needs to be conducted,
especially as some form of conscious thought
would seem central to the ongoing refinement
of skills that characterizes elite performers
(cf. Carson & Collins, 2011). Of equal impor-
tance, such research needs to take place in
environmentally valid settings since-to date;
many of the studies have used contrived, or
overly simple tasks (Beilock, Carr, MacMa-
hon, & Starkes, 2002; Gray, 2004; Mullen &
Hardy, 2000). Consequently, the derived re-
sults offer insufficient implication to guide, or
enable considered applied practice.
Of course, some researchers would ques-
tion the need for any conscious thought at the
top level. According to early models of skill
acquisition (Fitts & Posner, 1967), athletes
pass through three linear stages (cognitive,
associative, and autonomous) en route to be-
coming highly skilled. In the highest stage of
skill acquisition, however, it is believed there
is no need for thought or conscious control
(Vickers & Williams, 2007). Moreover, in
recent models of skill acquisition, researchers
have identified a state beyond automaticity
that athletes must attain before they can con-
sistently achieve the highest levels of exper-
tise (Vickers & Williams, 2007).
In contrast, based on studies of experts
across domains, Ericsson and colleagues have
asserted that theories relating to the automa-
ticity of human movement are limited expla-
nations of the processing and execution relat-
ing to skilled performance. Indeed, Williams
and Ericsson (2005) propose that experts
maintain high levels of conscious monitoring
and control, which are essential for further
improvements in performance to be realized.
Furthermore, such monitoring processes pro-
vide feedback through reportable thoughts
(Eccles, 2012) involving planning, reasoning,
and anticipation that can be used to diagnose
sources of error. It is suggested that derived
mental processes of this nature, enable prac-
titioners to design cognitive and behavioral
interventions to enhance clients’ perfor-
mance, and enable them to breakthrough cur-
rent performance plateaus (cf. Ericsson &
Kintsch, 1995).
The contention that experts experience
heightened (rather than decreased) levels of
conscious thought processing during task ex-
ecution was recently documented by McRob-
ert, Ward, Eccles, and Williams (2011): It
was demonstrated that the volume of thoughts
(the majority of which were task-related) re-
ported by skilled, versus less skilled, athletes
during performance was higher. Therefore,
this finding suggests that experts’ incidental
memory for task-relevant information is su-
perior to that of novices. Moreover, with re-
gard to expert performers, this implies that
aspects of perceptual and motor control are
mediated by attention-demanding cognitive
processes (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996). How-
ever, the distinction may be even more subtle
than this. For example, work by Toner and
Moran (2011) showed that only certain types
of thought disrupted performance: a topic
which we will return to later in this article.
Notwithstanding whether the direction of
conscious thoughts should be task-related or
promote automaticity through unconscious
processing, these emerging distinctions be-
tween different types of cognitions represent
the two extremes of the debate. To character-
ize the ideal mental state in relation to ex-
perts’ motor execution as a dichotomy be-
tween conscious and unconscious thought
lacks subtlety. Based on emerging evidence
(cf. Toner & Moran, 2011) is the assertion
that a motoric process takes cognitive capac-
ity, but it holds no necessary implication as to
the degree to which the process must be con-
sciously, as opposed to autonomously, guided
(Bargh, 1989; Kahneman & Treisman, 1984).
This is especially true in tactical decision-
making environments, or deciding on shot
selection where weighing options and re-
hearsing scenarios using imagined outcomes
is central to the execution of gross motor
skills. Therefore, the debate is still ongoing
regarding the most appropriate allocation of
attentional resources for executing skilled
performance.
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Can Implicit Practice Methods Be Adopted
in the Elite Environment?
Most automatic processes will require an ap-
preciable amount of training to develop fully
(Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). Therefore, how
elite performers train and subsequently practice
their skills is an important aspect for sport psy-
chologists to consider. Advances in cognitive
psychology have demonstrated that the acquisi-
tion of motor skill expertise relied on the pro-
gression of knowledge, from declarative where
performance is consciously controlled, to pro-
cedural and then tacit knowledge where task
execution is automatic and requires little atten-
tion (Bennett, 2000; Masters, 2000). Given the
serious consequences of perturbed motor be-
havior for athletes, it is not surprising that re-
searchers have sought to develop empirically
derived techniques influenced by advances in
cognitive psychology, and operationalized in
motor learning.
Implicit motor learning seeks to inure the
performer from cognition-related skill break-
down or, as Masters and Maxwell (2008) term
it, reinvestment. Reinvestment is defined as the
psychometrically determined tendency toward
conscious control (Masters & Maxwell, 2008).
It is held that reinvestment can be reduced by
minimizing the accumulation of consciously ac-
cessible task-relevant knowledge, used to con-
trol movements at a conscious level (Kinrade,
Jackson, & Ashford, 2010; Lam, Maxwell, &
Masters, 2010). In simple terms, the logic is that
“if you haven’t got the knowledge, you can’t
start thinking about it under pressure.” How-
ever, although implicit learning studies may
have fueled theoretical advances in understand-
ing skill acquisition (cf. Gabbett & Masters,
2011), the majority of this evidence has been
generated from studies of novice participants
performing closed skilled tasks. As such, any
application to high-level and more skilled per-
formers must surely be viewed with caution.
In a novel application to expert performers,
Rendell, Farrow, Masters, and Plummer (2011)
undertook a 6-week training intervention to ap-
ply implicit practice for the purpose of tech-
nique adaptation of a closed skilled task. Imme-
diately, this raises an important question as to
whether these expert performers in the study
agreed to skill refinement and, if so, whether or
not the resultant adaptations took place on a
truly unconscious level. Specifically, two expert
netball players practiced shooting to an adapted
ring while responding to a concurrent secondary
task (counting the number of low pitched tones
within each song that they were listening to).
One of the netball players demonstrated a de-
cline in primary task performance from an ini-
tial pretest score of 10 out of 15 shots, to a
posttest score of 8 out of 15 shots. The second-
ary task in this study acted as a distraction,
which was designed to prevent players from
accessing their explicit knowledge base. Unsur-
prisingly perhaps, one player’s preperformance
routine was not robust enough to withstand
these distractions, hence the performance im-
pairment. Reflecting on the methodology used,
the authors of this study concluded that the
dual-task approach to implicit practice is there-
fore not the most amenable protocol to use in an
applied practice environment (Rendell et al.,
2011). From our applied perspective, the case
for implicit approaches with more skilled per-
formers seems unproven.
A further point of contention regards the rate
of learning in dual-task approaches. Specifi-
cally, it is too slow for the constraints imposed
by elite-level sport. This proposition is based on
previous research, which has highlighted the
issue of slow learning using dual-task ap-
proaches (Hardy et al., 1996; MacMahon &
Masters, 2002; Maxwell et al., 2000; Mullen,
Hardy, & Oldham, 2007). Moreover, although
secondary tasks are a useful research tool be-
cause they demonstrate the limited capacity of
working memory (Baddeley, 2001), previous
researchers (Jackson et al., 2006) have demon-
strated that secondary tasks involving verbal
responses throughout a performance are not
practical to conduct in actual competitive situ-
ations, or during skill training where progres-
sion is important. Finally, the ecological valid-
ity of this approach (are you practicing in the
way you will eventually execute) and the trans-
fer back to the real-world is open to question.
As a further attempt to demonstrate the ap-
plicability of implicit learning in an applied
sports setting, Gabbett and Masters (2011) pro-
vided practical training activities and tech-
niques designed to facilitate the development of
implicit skills in rugby league. Aspects of their
intervention (e.g., “tackle like Frankenstein”)
were based on analogy learning (Liao & Mas-
ters, 2001). Analogies can be used to present the
4 WINTER, MACPHERSON, AND COLLINS
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
key coaching points of a to-be-learned skill as a
simple biomechanical metaphor that can be re-
produced by the learner without reference to, or
manipulation of large amounts of explicit infor-
mation. The example from Gabbett and Masters
(2011) purportedly illustrates how analogy
learning is being adopted and adapted to deal
with a concept (i.e., the potential to convey
implicit practice effects). However, this article
was set as a challenge for practitioners to de-
velop further applied techniques within the
sports in which they are working, rather than
providing research evidence that these strate-
gies were more effective and, consequently,
worthy of adoption in conjunction with elite
performers. Researchers therefore need to con-
sider exploring new models of implicit learning
that are conducive to the elite practice environ-
ment (Rendell et al., 2011).
On a slightly different, but related, point, we
would also suggest that implicit learning, ap-
proached in this analogy-based fashion, is not
original. It seems to hold substantial overlap
with coaching techniques already proposed in
the literature from very different theoretical par-
adigms (e.g., “bounce-hit”—Gallwey, 1981;
mood words and task-relevant cognitions—
Rushall, 1979). Both of these approaches use
word-based analogy to tighten an optimized fo-
cus, albeit from rather different epistemological
stances, and certainly a different perspective
than the implicit learning constructs suggested
by Masters and colleagues. As such, it would
seem reasonable to question whether the under-
lying mechanisms for analogy are uniquely
grounded in the implicit learning approach, or
whether other, more parsimonious/effective, ex-
planations and applications are available.
As a direct contrast to analogy learning in
elite performers, Ericsson and colleagues be-
lieve experts’ cognitions relating to gross motor
skill execution are not automated. They suggest
that experts are continually and consciously
processing information pertinent to perfor-
mance—especially when they are training, and
even more so when they are trying to improve
various aspects of their performance (cf. Carson
& Collins, 2011). Theoretically, automatic pro-
cessing is learned, retained in a long-term store,
is triggered by appropriate inputs, and then op-
erates independently of the performer’s control
(Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). However, be-
cause an automatic process uses a relatively
permanent set of associative connections in
long-term memory, an automatic process will
be difficult to suppress or alter. In comparison,
controlled processes capacity is tightly limited,
but the cost of capacity limitations is balanced
by the benefits derived from the ease with which
such processes may be set up, altered, and ap-
plied in novel situations—for which automatic
sequences have never been learned (Shiffrin &
Schneider, 1977).
This raises a further interesting debate with
implicit practice methods: if the athlete does not
have access to explicit conscious knowledge of
how to move, they will be unable to use such
knowledge to control, or alter these skills once
technical errors emerge (Beek, 2000; Lam et al.,
2010). Moreover, the athlete may face difficul-
ties with new skill challenges that emerge from
altered constraints (Carson & Collins, 2011).
Therefore, implicit learners may be unable to
learn from, correct, and prevent errors in sub-
sequent performances (Baddeley & Wilson,
1994), especially when some transfer of initial
learning is required (cf. Barreiros, Figueiredo,
& Godinho, 2007; Porter, Landin, Hebert, &
Baum, 2007). This lack of explicit information
could also leave less material for the performer
to rehearse and, consequently, result in spare
attentional capacity being erroneously focused
on distracting information (Bennett, 2000). We
would therefore suggest that implicit motor
learning in the high-performance sporting envi-
ronment offers significant challenges to practi-
tioners faced with how to adapt skills that are
well learned.
Preparing to Think, or Not to Think?
The goal for many sport psychology practi-
tioners is to help athletes develop their mental
skills, with the aim to facilitate performance
consistently at an elite level (Harmison, 2011).
Evidenced by the publication of psychological
technique use by sport performers and studies of
interventions designed by practitioners (Gard-
ner & Moore, 2006), the extant studies have
made noteworthy contributions to our current
understanding of performers’ psychological
preparation for competition (Eccles, 2012).
Reviewing this literature, most researchers
consider psychological techniques to have a
cognitive basis even if they have behavioral
components (e.g., goal setting). Furthermore,
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Vealey (1994) stated that a major premise of
mental skills training (MST) is that athletes
may need to learn cognitive skills and strate-
gies to cope with the various demands of
sport competition. Thus, given that psycho-
logical strategies essentially involve cogni-
tive processes (Eccles, 2012), reports about
psychological strategies are essentially re-
ports about cognitive processes.
In this regard, the use of preperformance rou-
tines has long been advocated as a tool through
which these higher levels of (cognitive) perfor-
mance and consistency can be achieved (Cot-
terill, 2010). Both empirical and anecdotal evi-
dence suggest that preperformance routines are
effective as a means for promoting physical and
mental readiness before performance execution
(Lidor & Singer, 2007). Numerous hypotheses
have been investigated to explain the functions
which preperformance routines fulfill. With
regards to thought processes, these include
diverting attention from task-irrelevant to task-
relevant thoughts (Gould & Udry, 1994), deal-
ing with distractions (Boutcher & Crews, 1987),
acting as a trigger for well-learnt movement
patterns (Lonsdale & Tam, 2008), and prescrib-
ing an attentional focus (Harle & Vickers,
2001).
Of course, if these various functions of prep-
erformance routines are to be fulfilled, then
associated self-regulatory techniques are essen-
tial (Carver & Scheier, 1998). Implementing
this approach to psychological preparation
therefore requires the allocation of appropriate
cognitive–behavioral techniques to allow the
athlete to transform maladaptive cognitions to
those that are readily adaptable (Andersen,
2005). Cotterill, Sanders, and Collins (2010)
and Jackson and Baker (2001) advocated the
use of different cognitive techniques within
elite athlete’s preperformance routines, for ex-
ample, self-talk, imagery, trigger words, and
distraction-avoidance techniques were docu-
mented to control and direct performer’s emo-
tions, thoughts, and attention, thereby placing
emphasis on developing athletes’ conscious
thoughts that promote better task/performance.
As Hardy, Oliver, and Tod (2009) recently
stated, rather than focusing on helping athletes
deal with thoughts they are trying to avoid, a
more proactive strategy may be to assist them in
identifying thoughts they want to have at spe-
cific moments in time. The focus therefore be-
ing on promoting techniques that can aid the
right thoughts tailored to preparation and opti-
mal execution (Cotterill, 2011).
In contrast to these developments, there has
been an increasing amount of literature that has
sought to determine the cognitive techniques
that underlie unconscious processing (Kinrade
et al., 2010; Lam et al., 2010; Liao & Masters,
2001). One such construct is the use of priming
as a preparation tool for performance. Priming
refers to “the influence a stimulus has on sub-
sequent performance of the processing system”
(Baddeley, 1997, p. 352). To prime an individ-
ual’s performance, a commonly used method
from cognitive psychology is for participants to
be presented with a series of five-word items in
which they are required to use four of the words
to form a grammatically correct sentence
(Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Kay & Ross,
2003; Srull & Wyer, 1979). It has been sug-
gested that primes developed to manipulate per-
formers’ foci toward global aspects of perfor-
mance would be advantageous, as they would
facilitate automaticity (Bargh et al., 1996;
Bruce, Carson, Burton, & Ellis, 2000; Hull,
Slone, Meteyer, & Matthews, 2002). Priming
has been supported in the literature pertaining to
social cognition (Bry, Follenfant, & Meyer,
2008; Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1998;
Schubert & Häfner, 2003); however, by com-
parison, sports scientists working with ad-
vanced performers have conducted little re-
search on this topic.
In attempts to close this gap, recent innova-
tive applications to physical performance have
been undertaken (Ashford & Jackson, 2010;
Banting, Dimmock, & Grove, 2011; Bry,
Meyer, Oberlé, & Gherson, 2009). Researchers
have used a scrambled sentence method, which
is undertaken by participants before a hockey-
dribbling task (Ashford & Jackson, 2010), a
cycling task (Banting et al., 2011), and a relay
race (Bry et al., 2009). Arguably, only the first
of these three studies was concerned with prim-
ing impacts on motor aspects of performance.
Both Banting et al. and Bry et al. could be seen
to have influenced motor performance through
changes, not in priming motor execution, but
rather in enhancing motivation—a more tradi-
tional use of interventions that use priming
(e.g., the relation between the strength of the
prime and the strength of the resulting behav-
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ioral effect, Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg,
1998).
In light of the dual purposes of the present
article, the aforementioned Ashford and Jack-
son (2010) study requires further consideration.
First, the preperformance priming condition
was contrasted with an in-performance explicit
focus condition, a technique seemingly de-
signed to obstruct performance by promoting
thinking about the task through explicit instruc-
tions (Baumeister, 1984). Moreover, the diffi-
culty of a task within the constraints of the
experimental protocol operationally delineates
its nominal level of difficulty (Guadagnoli &
Lee, 2004). This skill-focus condition involved
a secondary task and thereby posed an addi-
tional cognitive challenge, which is not directly
comparable with any of the other conditions
used within the Ashford and Jackson study.
Second, and attempting to address this errone-
ous preperformance to in-performance contrast,
the new priming approach was not compared
with another, more well-established preperfor-
mance strategy. Not only would this represent a
fairer comparison (between two preperfor-
mance strategies), it would also enable an eval-
uation of the comparative efficacy of priming
against another empirically supported prepara-
tion technique.
Reflecting these stances, a recent study by
Winter and Collins (2013) investigated the
comparative efficacy of the primarily conscious
technique of imagery (Holmes & Calmels,
2008), to the unconscious priming paradigm
(Bargh et al., 1996; Bruce et al., 2000; Hull et
al., 2002). Ashford and Jackson’s (2010) hock-
ey-dribbling task was adopted for the study.
Participants were required to use an Indian drib-
ble to maneuver a field-hockey ball around a
12-m slalom course, marked out by cones at
1-m intervals. The priming intervention took the
form of a scrambled sentence task (Srull &
Wyer, 1979), words associated with autono-
mous performance were selected for the content
of the prime: for example, “controlled,” “flu-
ent,” and “graceful.” Before completing trials,
participants were given unlimited time to com-
plete the grammatical task, comprising 30 five-
word items presented in a random order: for
example, “slalom balanced was the where.” Par-
ticipants were instructed to use four of the five
words presented to form a grammatically cor-
rect sentence, for example, “the slalom was
balanced.”
Examination of performance times across the
four attention conditions revealed performance
to be significantly faster in the imagery condi-
tion than in all the other three conditions. Fur-
thermore, there was no significant difference in
the performance times between the priming and
control conditions where participants found
priming to have no additional performance ben-
efits than the control instruction of “complete
the dribbling task as quickly and accurately as
possible.” The study therefore provided further
support for the efficacy of imagery to elicit
enhanced motor performance (Smith, Wright,
Allsopp & Westhead, 2007; Wakefield &
Smith, 2011). From a philosophical standpoint,
Winter and Collins (2013) questioned the ex-
amination of techniques in an applied field
(sport psychology), which have doubtful appli-
cation for practitioners working in the real-
world with performers.
If practitioners in the field are considering the
priming technique as a gross motor preparation
tool, additional pragmatic concerns on the ap-
plication to real-world settings exist. A com-
monly used method, to prime an individual’s
performance, is for participants to be presented
with a series of five-word items in which they
are required to use four of the words to form a
grammatically correct sentence (Bargh et al.,
1996; Kay & Ross, 2003; Srull & Wyer, 1979).
The scrambled sentence paradigm has been
used to determine how a cognitive representa-
tion primed in one situation affects behavior in
a seemingly unrelated scenario (Bargh & Char-
trand, 2000). Expecting athletes to complete
sentence-scrambling tasks before performing
could be viewed as unrealistic. Alternative
methods of presenting the primes (e.g., a video
containing subliminal primes or flashcards) are
therefore necessary (Bruce et al., 2000) if prac-
titioners working in the real-world are to adopt
priming as a gross motor cue.
Another issue that bears on the utility of
priming relates to the nature of participant
awareness of the prime. When participants com-
plete priming tasks in research settings, it is a
novel activity (Ashford & Jackson, 2010; Bargh
et al., 1996; Hull et al., 2002). The priming
paradigms are proposed to be implicit in nature,
as participants are not aware of the prime or its
intended effect. However, if practitioners in the
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sporting world were asking athletes to perform
the priming technique on a regular basis—as
part of their psychological preparation—this
premise would certainly be compromised.
Moreover, from an applied standpoint there are
important practical considerations to be re-
solved if priming only works when the per-
former is unaware as to the purpose of the
technique. This is certainly implied by the
“mere exposure” construct (Zajonc, 1980),
where explicit, as opposed to implicit, priming
reduces the effect (Bornstein, 1989). Further-
more, applied practitioners are guided by codes
of conducts published by their governing bodies
(e.g., the American Psychological Associa-
tion—APA; British Psychological Society—
BPS; and the British Association of Sport and
Exercise Sciences—BASES). Therefore, for ap-
plied practitioners to use a technique with their
performers on a regular basis that essentially,
they cannot disclose the purpose of poses an
interesting ethical question (Biddle, Bull, &
Seheult, 1992; Petitpas, Brewer, Rivera, & Van
Raalte, 1994).
Techniques developed to use unconscious
processing to facilitate automaticity are a
contentious matter. Reflecting these concerns,
the debate is ongoing regarding the compar-
ative efficacy of strategies to develop con-
scious thoughts that are conducive to physical
performance.
Offering a Middle Ground for
Applied Practitioners
A significant percentage of sport psychology
research to date has focused on reducing the
effects of “unwanted” cognitions. As discussed
previously, theoretical propositions (e.g., the
explicit monitoring hypothesis and theory of
reinvestment) have considered the effects of
debilitating cognitions (Beilock & Carr, 2001;
Masters, 1992) and their associated effects on
performance in sport. With regards to these,
Toner and Moran (2011) found that conscious
control is not necessarily detrimental to skilled
execution, especially if directed to an external
focus or on rhythmical properties of movement.
Through concentrating on the holistic nature of
movement, conscious control is thereby coun-
tering the negative aspects of explicit methods,
while conveying the positives of implicit prac-
tice effects. Evidence from the sport psychology
literature in this regard can be exemplified
through the work on the impact of holistic and
rhythmic cues.
In the Toner and Moran (2011) study, tech-
nically adjusting golfers’ putting strokes dis-
rupted the overall consistency of the movement.
This result supports the findings from an earlier
case study that examined the mental foci and
movement patterns of three international stan-
dard javelin throwers and one elite world-class
thrower. One of the international standard jav-
elin throwers (MacPherson et al., 2008), fo-
cused on arm/shoulder speed—a subset of the
whole throw. As a consequence of this verbally
administered part-skill cue, the rest of the
movement pattern led to relative instability of
the whole, or holistic movement pattern. Qual-
itative analysis of post training and event cog-
nitions elicited by the athlete revealed that the
athlete’s attention was focused on a subcompo-
nent rather than the whole movement: “attend-
ing to one subroutine may have interfered with
the consistency of the whole movement” (p.
299). In short, focus on one part of the skill may
provide a consistent execution of an inevitably
less than optimum pattern.
Masters (1992) predicts that focusing on part
of a movement, using process goals that are
underpinned by explicit knowledge, may dis-
rupt the normal automatic task processing of
experts. Consequently, this leads to lapses into
conscious control and subsequent performance
impairment. Researchers therefore suggest that,
to prevent performance impairment under pres-
sure, a single holistic movement-focused goal
will be more effective than a single part move-
ment-focused goal (Collins, Morriss, & Trower,
1999; MacPherson et al., 2008; MacPherson,
Collins, & Obhi, 2009; Mullen & Hardy, 2010).
For example, Mullen and Hardy (2010) used
three different motor tasks to examine the im-
pact of different mental sets in association with
high cognitive state anxiety. A single holistic
process goal interacted with increased levels of
cognitive state anxiety to help maintain or im-
prove motor performance. In contrast, a single
part process goal led to inferior performance,
under the same conditions. Specifically, Mullen
and Hardy suggest that holistic process goals
may allow performers to incorporate the indi-
vidual subunits of a task into a single global
representation, allowing the movement to run
more smoothly and automatically. Notably
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however, teasing out the role of cognitive anx-
iety in this interaction may require more de-
tailed, even qualitative, examination.
Evidence pertaining to rhythmicity lends cre-
dence to this idea, and advocates focusing on
holistic temporally accurate movement cues
(Collins et al., 1999); in short, stressing what is
required rather than trying to counter what
might prevent it (cf. Hardy et al., 2009). Part of
the explanation as to why rhythm holds consid-
erable benefits for the optimization of move-
ment patterns across sports can be found in
recent advances in neuroscience. Where a pa-
tient’s ability to time and sequence patterned
coordination has been lost, the use of external
rhythmic cues has been shown to reinitiate am-
bulatory movement patterns in patients suffer-
ing from movement disorders (Praamstra,
Stegeman, Cools, & Horstink, 1998). Rhythm
used in this way enables direct communication
with stored representations of movement, which
can, in turn, initiate effective movement pat-
terns. In simple terms, this direct line may help
the performer to bypass the potentially disrup-
tive emotionally charged or negative self-talk
cognitions, which are justifiably identified as
the enemy of expert performance. Illustrating
this point, recently, following Phil Mickelson’s
Open Golf Championship win, his coach, Butch
Harmon, stated the following, “All we spoke
about (in preparation for the final round) was
the rhythm of his swing and that was phenom-
enal all day Sunday” (Murray, 2013).
Empirical research on rhythm and the effect it
is deemed to play on successful task execution
is increasingly evident. For example, Renshaw
and Davids (2006) contrasted the respective
run-ups of cricket bowlers and long jumpers. It
was determined that cricket bowlers demon-
strated lower gait variability than long jumpers
and accordingly, this enabled bowlers to de-
velop, “a stable rhythmic movement pattern at
a controlled velocity” (Renshaw & Davids,
2006, p. 16).
However, the central question—germane to
this portion of the present article— is concerned
with determining whether or not rhythmic
movement patterns are associated with better
performances—particularly when athletes, as is
often the case, are required to move at close to
peak horizontal velocity. In a study conducted
by MacPherson, Collins, Graham-Smith, and
Turner (2013), six full-time international ath-
letes, all of whom were/are elite horizontal
jumpers were filmed on approach to the take-off
board in competitions over a 2-year period. In
four out of the six athletes, a clear positive
association was determined between low levels
of footfall variation (i.e., rhythmical footfall)
and jumps which were in each athlete’s upper
quartile of distances achieved. Therefore, it can
be asserted that there are increased levels of
evidence to associate stable rhythmic move-
ment patterns, not only with specific sports, as
in the case of golf and cricket, but of superior
personal performances for elite performers.
Recording and replaying the rhythmical
(footfall) or heightening a performer’s kines-
thetic appreciation of a honed practiced golf-
swing acts as a further exemplar link between
cognition to movement: more specifically, it
demonstrates the effect of using an auditory
template as not only a movement cue, but also
as a buffer against unwanted or unintentional
thoughts. In the case study of the elite javelin
thrower (MacPherson et al., 2008), an interest-
ing pattern was discerned. Movement variabil-
ity was low in training but, crucially, even lower
in competition. However, the most instructive
findings were gleaned when the mental foci of
the athletes were contrasted with their respec-
tive performances in-event. The elite thrower,
immediately following his performance stated
that his focus was on, “Rhythm . . . just rhythm.
I have to hear the music.” In addition, he stated
that, “I work hard on keeping the whole action
together” (MacPherson et al., 2008, p. 298).
The “music” to which the elite athlete was re-
ferring was the recorded footfall that he re-
hearsed before throwing (cf. Ainscoe & Hardy,
1987). This external rhythmical cue is “holistic”
because it provides accurate temporal informa-
tion of a complex sequence of movements that
corresponds to a stored representation.
In the “preparing to think, or not to think”
section, we discussed the use of preperformance
routines for promoting physical and mental
readiness before execution. Using an auditory
cue may also be in effect a preperformance
routine and a means of focusing processing
capacity on the task, rather than leaving space
for an attentional shift to build. Southard and
Miracle (1993) used data from the basketball
free throw to indicate that the consistent rhyth-
micity of preperformance rituals was more im-
portant to successful shot outcome than main-
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taining the absolute time taken. They concluded
that, “we interpret the timing of behaviors to be
a natural manifestation of rhythmic activity in
the system” (p. 290). A preperformance routine
may therefore offer a rhythmical guide that de-
limits debilitating cognitions and has the effect
of maintaining or increasing individual perfor-
mance effectiveness.
Auditory cues used in training and recalled in
competition, offer a number of potential advan-
tages to the athlete. First, the amount of infor-
mation that can be carried in an auditory rhythm
concerning the coordination of a movement pat-
tern is considerable. Second, as we seek to
understand the most effective allocation of
thought processes for elite performance, rhyth-
micity encapsulates all three sections of our
discussion, namely, execution, practice, and
preparation. Furthermore, an auditory rhythm
can indicate when the execution of a movement
should commence, when it should cease, and
how a considerable number of the subroutines
involved in the whole movement could be or-
ganized in relation to one another (MacPherson
et al., 2008). Hence, we are suggesting a change
in focus or, at least, an additional focus for
applied practitioners: understanding the rhythm
and temporal properties of movements can pro-
vide meaningful insight into the processes un-
derlying successful motor task performance.
This, in turn, may provide the practitioner with
important tools for eliciting optimal execution
of sport performance, which may offer greater
potential than cognitively focused manipula-
tions such as priming or implicit learning.
Conclusion
In any applied discipline, scientist–practitio-
ners seek guidance from a prevailing theoretical
and empirical paradigm to underpin, inform,
and guide their work. This is an example of
translational research, which involves the appli-
cation of theories, constructs, research findings,
and intervention techniques across psychologi-
cal domains. Through reviewing contemporary
theory and research findings focused on the
allocation of attentional resources in elite per-
formers, the present discussion has contextual-
ized this process with regards to execution,
practice, and preparation, while seeking clarity
to optimize practice. As a result, we suggest a
need for further research designed to be impact-
ful in applied settings.
For example, from a cognitive neuroscience
approach, future mechanistic explanations
could be provided to explain the motor control
processes and how these strategies translate to
the quality of movement of the limbs, in terms
of the neural processes leading to the recruit-
ment of the motor units. Researchers should
therefore continue to examine the mechanisms
that store, initiate, and retrieve movement, thus
furthering our understanding, and enabling ap-
propriate interventions to be attempted. Such an
approach would be particularly pertinent to the
“performance under pressure” criteria that char-
acterizes sport. Positively, there are already sev-
eral examples of this approach, using a variety
of different tools (MacPherson et al., 2013;
Toner & Moran, 2011).
Of course, such an approach places con-
straints on the design of any study; constraints
that may severely limit the experimental “con-
trol” that journals may require. The extent to
which researchers are able to provide transla-
tional research for applied practitioners is de-
pendent on the techniques of interest being eco-
logically valid: actual task execution must take
place in a competitive environment and with all
relevant constraints included. It is therefore im-
portant for researchers to address the method-
ological concerns highlighted within this re-
view, and provide ecologically valid testing of
the associated theoretical predictions, if further
understanding is to be gained and appropriate
interventions generated.
Furthermore, the theory–research–practice
relations do not have to involve a one-way
causal path. Attending to these three reciprocal
linkages enables psychologists to ensure that
the knowledge, research, and interventions will
support one another and advance the field as a
scientific and applied discipline. We would rec-
ommend it be in our professional interests to
seek clarity to determine the guidelines for best
practice from experienced practitioners who are
currently working in the field. Too often we are
coming up with answers to questions which
no-one in the applied field has asked, or at least
answers to rather selective and limited ques-
tions. In addition, elite athletes performing ex-
ceptionally well in the sporting world should
permit the working model to flow the other way
from practice–research–theory. In other words,
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all parts of the researcher–practitioner team can
benefit.
In summary, a notion has emerged from the
literature that certain types of thinking are det-
rimental to optimal execution, or that perform-
ers should avoid thinking when performing. The
evidence we presented to counter this advocates
a focus on holistic temporally accurate move-
ment cues. Reflecting the discussed parameters,
we provide an overview as to why externalized
auditory rhythms hold significant advantages in
the execution, practice, and preparation for elite
performers. Accordingly, allowing practitioners
to adopt a strategy that is both applicable to an
ecologically valid environment and that encour-
ages individuals to focus on an optimal source
of movement information.
Understanding and explaining the mecha-
nisms, cognitive processes, and self-regulatory
strategies that enable the acquisition and profi-
cient execution of skills, thus poses challenges
for the evidence-based practitioner (Singer,
2000). From the psychological evidence pre-
sented, the logical conclusion is clear: actual
thinking is not the issue; it is thinking the wrong
way that is the problem!
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